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The Egyptians Attack
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Thirty-two years have passed
since Egypt and Syria armies caught Israel by surprise on
Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement and the holiest day in
the Jewish calendar. At around two o'clock in the afternoon,
while Israelis were at prayer in synagogues across the country,
massive Arab forces attacked across the Suez Canal and on
the Golan Heights. Outnumbered by ten to one and more, the
Egyptian and Syrian troops and tanks overran the sparse
Israeli defenders and appeared to threaten the very existence
of the Jewish state. Before the IDF recovered and drove
back the invading armies, 2,586 Israeli soldiers were killed
and thousands more wounded. It was a monumental intelligence
failure and the trauma in Israel continues to this very
day. What went wrong? Dr Uri Bar-Yosef, a strategic analyst
at Haifa University and an IDF Colonel (res.) has conducted
an exhaustive study in his book entitled 'The Watchman Fell
Asleep’ which has recently appeared in English. |
'The symptoms of Israel's intelligence
failure in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 still remain'. That's the
conclusion of Dr Uri Bar Yosef in his book 'The Watchman Fell
Asleep'. Bar Yosef warns it could happen again although he does
not see Israel being surprised by a conventional Arab attack in
the foreseeable future. Prior to the Arab offensive on October
6th, 1973, IDF intelligence had received a lot of information
indicating that Egypt and Syria were planning to attack. However,
IDF intelligence adhered to its conception that the Arabs would
not dare go to war again until they had acquired greater air power
and more effective ground-to-ground missiles.
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IDF Crosses Suez Canal
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Dr Bar-Yosef warns that Israel
has not fully implemented the recommendations of the Agranat commission
of enquiry into the intelligence failure. Aman, the IDF Intelligence
Corps continues to dominate Israel's national security assessment,
which should be based on political as well as military considerations.
Moreover, the Yom Kippur experience has influenced Aman to view
new evolving situations as threats rather opportunities. Bar Yosef
contends that this approach thwarted the IDF's withdrawal from
south Lebanon for years at the cost of many IDF soldiers.
What if retired Gen. Ariel Sharon,
who toppled the Egyptian army by eventually leading the IDF crossing
across the Suez Canal, had still been in command at the outbreak
of the war? Would it have made a difference to the initial Egyptian
success in taking the IDF by total surprise? Sharon had been the
former Southern Front commander before retiring from the IDF.
Bar Yosef believes it would have been a different story if Sharon
had still been in command. Sharon would have probably reacted
to the massive Egyptian buildup by mobilizing all available IDF
forces including 200 tanks, which were caught out of position
to the rear. Those tanks could have destroyed much of the Egyptian
forces crossing the Suez Canal.
David Essing, ISRACAST,
Jerusalem
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